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MCP / Agent Server Security Checklist

$29

Audit-ready security checklists and a STRIDE threat model for remote MCP servers and agent-facing APIs: auth, input validation, rate limiting, secrets, payments, and data-exposure controls.

7 filesv1.0.0 (updated 2026-08-02)
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File Structure 7 files

mcp-security-checklist/ ├── LICENSE ├── README.md ├── THREAT-MODEL.md └── checklists/ ├── data-exposure.md ├── payments.md └── pre-launch.md

Documentation Preview README excerpt

MCP / Agent Server Security Checklist & Threat Model

A practical, audit-ready security checklist and threat model for anyone running a

remote MCP server or an agent-facing HTTP API. Agent traffic is a new

attack surface: the "user" may be an autonomous model steered by an untrusted

prompt. This pack is the checklist used to harden a live, payment-handling MCP

server before it went public.

What's inside

  • checklists/pre-launch.md — a gating checklist to run before you expose an

endpoint to agents (auth, input validation, rate limiting, secrets, CORS).

  • checklists/payments.md — extra controls when an agent can trigger money

movement (price-tampering, idempotency, webhook verification, no autonomous

charging).

  • checklists/data-exposure.md — preventing leakage of secrets, signed URLs,

storage paths, PII, and other-customer data through tools/previews.

  • THREAT-MODEL.md — the STRIDE-style threat model with concrete mitigations,

mapped to the checklists.

Who this is for

  • Engineers shipping a remote MCP server or agent API.
  • Security reviewers auditing one.
  • Anyone letting an agent take an action that costs money or touches user data.

The one-paragraph version

Treat every agent request as potentially prompt-injected and hostile. Validate

and constrain all inputs at the boundary. Resolve anything sensitive (price, ids,

file paths) server-side — never from the caller. Rate-limit and log without

recording PII. Keep secrets and signed URLs out of every tool response. Require

buyer authorization for payments; never charge autonomously. Verify webhooks with

the signing-secret flow. Scope every "get my stuff" tool to a proven owner.

Requirements

None — this is documentation you apply to your own stack. No dependencies.

File tree


checklists/
  pre-launch.md      # gate before exposing to agents
  payments.md        # money-movement controls
  data-exposure.md   # secret / PII / path leakage prevention
THREAT-MODEL.md      # STRIDE threats + mitigations

License

MIT — copy these into your own runbooks and repos.

Content Sample THREAT-MODEL.md

Threat Model — Remote MCP / Agent-Facing API

A STRIDE-style threat model for an agent-facing service. The novel element vs a

normal API: the "user" is often an LLM steered by untrusted input (web pages,

documents, other tools). Treat every request as potentially prompt-injected.

Assets

  • Payment capability (ability to create charges).
  • Customer entitlements and downloadable artifacts.
  • Secrets (processor keys, database keys, signing secrets).
  • Catalogue integrity (price, sellability, verification status).

Trust boundaries

  • Agent client → your endpoint (fully untrusted; may be adversarial).
  • Your endpoint → payment processor (trusted, key-authenticated).
  • Payment processor → your webhook (trusted only after signature verification).

STRIDE

Spoofing

  • Threat: caller claims to be a user/owner it is not.
  • Mitigation: ownership via unguessable capability tokens or verified auth

subject; never trust a client-supplied user id. (data-exposure.md, pre-launch.md)

Tampering

  • Threat: caller alters price/amount/currency/ids to underpay or buy blocked

items; alters redirect to phish.

  • Mitigation: resolve all money + ids server-side; reject client money fields;

allowlist redirects; DB constraint blocking sale of unaudited/deprecated items.

(payments.md)

Repudiation

  • Threat: disputed or unattributable actions.
  • Mitigation: structured, PII-free audit logs; processor metadata (order id,

agent id) on every payment. (pre-launch.md)

Information disclosure

  • Threat: leakage of secrets, signed URLs, storage paths, PII, or other

customers' data via tools/previews/errors.

  • Mitigation: never return secrets/signed URLs; preview sanitizer; owner-scoped

reads; redacting logs; safe error messages. (data-exposure.md)

Denial of service

  • Threat: high-volume agent traffic exhausts resources or budget (e.g. mass

checkout-session creation).

  • Mitigation: per-IP/key rate limits, tighter on mutations; cheap read paths

... and much more in the full download.