Incident Response Playbook
A ready-to-run IR kit for small and mid-size teams: a clear operating model, five attack-specific 3-a.m. runbooks, severity classification, on-call escalation, tabletop exercises, and printable communication templates. Built to be usable under pressure.
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Incident Response Playbook
A ready-to-run incident response kit for small and mid-size teams: a clear
operating model, five attack-specific runbooks you can actually follow at 3 a.m.,
and the templates that turn a stressful breach into a consistent, defensible
response. Built to be usable under pressure — short, specific, and printable —
not a 90-page binder nobody opens.
The goal of incident response isn't to never have incidents. It's to respond
consistently and fast when you do, limit the harm, and learn so it doesn't
recur. A mediocre plan you actually run beats a perfect plan nobody knows.
Who this is for
- Security, SRE, IT, or engineering leads who own "what happens when we get hit."
- Startups and growing teams that need a real IR capability before the first
serious incident — without hiring a consultancy to write a binder.
- Teams preparing for SOC 2 / ISO 27001 / customer security reviews that ask "show
me your incident response plan and evidence you practice it."
No specific tooling is assumed. The playbooks reference capabilities (EDR, paging,
logging, backups) generically so they fit your stack.
What's inside
incident-response-playbook/
├── README.md # You are here
├── LICENSE
├── docs/
│ ├── incident-response-overview.md # The operating model: lifecycle, roles, RACI, principles
│ ├── severity-classification.md # SEV-1..4 matrix + decision flow + worked examples
│ ├── on-call-escalation.md # On-call model, escalation ladder, paging rules
│ └── tabletop-exercise-guide.md # How to practice — with 3 ready scenarios
├── playbooks/
│ ├── ransomware.md # Default SEV-1; isolate-don't-poweroff, backups, ransom
│ ├── phishing-bec.md # Phishing & business email compromise / wire fraud
│ ├── data-breach.md # Confirmed/suspected data exposure + notification clock
│ ├── account-compromise.md # Credential theft, MFA bypass, takeover
│ └── ddos.md # Volumetric / application-layer denial of service
├── templates/
│ ├── communication-templates.md # Fill-in messages: internal, exec, customer, regulator, press
│ ├── forensic-evidence-checklist.md # Order of volatility, chain of custody, evidence log
│ ├── post-incident-review.md # Blameless PIR / postmortem template
│ ├── incident-log.csv # Master incident register
│ └── escalation-roster.csv # On-call + IR roles + external contacts
└── examples/
└── worked-incident-timeline.md # A full ransomware incident, start to finish
17 files, all plain Markdown and CSV — open them in anything, print them, drop them
in your wiki, or commit them to a repo. No build step, no dependencies.
Quick start (you have an incident *right now*)
1. Declare and classify. Open docs/severity-classification.md, set a severity.
When in doubt, round up.
2. Get the right people. docs/on-call-escalation.md + templates/escalation-roster.csv
... continues with setup instructions, usage examples, and more.
Content Sample examples/worked-incident-timeline.md
Worked Example: A Ransomware Incident, End to End
This is a fictional but realistic walk-through of a single incident — INC-2026-001
at the fictional Acme Corp — run against this playbook from first alert to closed
post-incident review. It shows the phases, the roles, the decisions, and the
communications working together. Every name, system, and detail is invented for
illustration.
Use it two ways: as a worked answer for the ransomware playbook, and as a script
for your first tabletop exercise (docs/tabletop-exercise-guide.md).
At a glance
| Incident | INC-2026-001 — Ransomware encrypting file servers |
| Severity | SEV-1 |
| Channel | #inc-2026-001 |
| IC | A. Rivera |
| Tech Lead | D. Park |
| Comms Lead | M. Sato |
| Scribe | L. Nguyen |
| Legal/Privacy | R. Bauer |
| Exec Sponsor | CTO |
| Detected | 2026-01-09 07:48 (local) |
| Contained | 2026-01-09 11:14 (3h12m after declaration) |
| Resolved | 2026-01-14 |
Timezone: all times local. The scribe kept the canonical timeline in
#inc-2026-001; this is the cleaned-up version produced for the PIR.
Phase 1–2: Detection & Identification (Day 1, morning)
| Time | Event / action | Who |
|---|---|---|
| 07:48 | EDR fires a mass-encryption + shadow-copy-deletion alert on file server FS01. Almost simultaneously the help desk gets calls: "all my files have a weird extension and won't open." | EDR / help desk |
| 07:52 | Ops primary on-call acks the page within SLA, opens a triage call, sees the same behavior starting on FS02. | On-call |
| 07:58 | On-call recognizes this is beyond triage and escalates to L2 (per docs/on-call-escalation.md). | On-call |
| 08:02 | A. Rivera declares SEV-1, opens #inc-2026-001, assigns D. Park (Tech Lead) and L. Nguyen (Scribe). Logs it in templates/incident-log.csv. (Containment clock starts here.) | IC |
| 08:05 | Per the severity matrix, IC pages Comms (M. Sato), Security Lead, and notifies the Exec Sponsor (CTO) immediately — SEV-1 requires it. | IC |
Why it's SEV-1: active, spreading encryption of a core service and customer
data availability — straight to SEV-1 by the decision flow in
docs/severity-classification.md. No debate needed.
Phase 3: Containment (Day 1, 08:05–11:14)
... and much more in the full download.